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IntroductIon
This paper is an attempt to consider the question of information 
warfare in the latest edition (December 2014) of Russia’s military 
doctrine. I shall consider it in the light of similar assumptions in 
the editions of the doctrine from the years 2000 and 2010. It is 
based on the idea that information warfare is a pre-emptive re-
sponse to both assumed and potential political threats to Russia. 
The starting point of this analysis is a description of the informa-
tion campaign accompanying the publication of the doctrine. In 
Part 1, I discuss the doctrinal assumptions of information war-
fare, extracting those details that allow the identification of some 
general trends in the Russian Federation’s security and defence 
policy. In Part 2, I interpret the concepts used in the doctrine by 
recalling the statements made by military theorists, the main 
themes of public discourse over the last few years about the dan-
gers of informational threats, and the concept of strategic culture.
Information on the military dimension has been consistently pre-
sented in official documents since 2000. A more detailed analysis 
of these issues makes it possible to identify some general trends in 
Russia’s security policy, which have become more pronounced in 
the years 2000-2014. These boil down to a blurring of the bounda-
ries between internal and external threats, the introduction into 
armed conflict of non-military methods and organisational struc-
tures, and the conferral of an ideological character on this con-
flict. This erases the contours of conflicts between states, allowing 
Russia to participate in armed conflicts in which it is not officially 
a party.
In highlighting the informational threat and presenting it as 
a new type of danger, the authors of the doctrine are outlining the 
contours of information warfare. In their opinion, this is a kind 
of battle between parties which is conducted by conventional and 
unconventional, open and secret means, using both military and 
non-military organisational structures (special forces, irregular 
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armed forces, internal opposition in the enemy country). In the 
Russian military doctrine and thinking, information warfare has 
two dimensions: broader (as a separate kind of combat waged at 
all levels: political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, mili-
tary) and narrower (as an element of support for military action).
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KEY PoIntS
1. The military doctrine of the Russian Federation, and the in-
formational and interpretive campaign accompanying it, 
are one element of Russia’s overall information strategy. The 
functional aspect of the strategy reflects the concept of infor-
mation warfare as outlined in the doctrine. It is identical to 
the concept of information warfare which is regularly pushed 
forward by journalists and civilian analysts. Its objectives, 
means and methods do not fit into the conventional notion of 
war. This concept is a sign of the militarisation of the Krem-
lin’s policy; it allows society to be mobilised, and (through ma-
nipulation of domestic and foreign public opinion) for Russia’s 
actions on the domestic and international stage to be legiti-
mised. For this reason, the doctrine has significant practical 
value: it sets the stage for potential military interventions, 
and creates excuses for the Russian Armed Forces to be used.
2. The doctrinal assumptions about information warfare dem-
onstrate not so much a change in the theory of its conduct (the 
changes mainly relate to the form of its description, and not the 
content), but rather a clinging to old methods (sabotage, diver-
sionary tactics, disinformation, state terror, manipulation, ag-
gressive propaganda, exploiting the potential for protest among 
the local population). In describing the methods of active intel-
ligence and counterintelligence doctrine developed since the 
1920s, a new type of war has been adapted from Anglo-Saxon 
theories: asymmetric, non-contact, indirect operations. By 
adapting Western terms to their own system of concepts and 
their own needs, the Russians have also given them their own 
specific content. This conceptual apparatus serves to emphasise 
that Russia’s actions are no different from those taken by the 
West, including the ‘masking’ of their real aims.
3. The theory of information warfare is part of Russia’s strate-
gic culture. It is characterised by, among other features: the 
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‘besieged fortress’ syndrome; the desire to guarantee their 
own security without respect for the security of other coun-
tries; the authoritarian regime’s fear of revolt; mythologising 
its own army and special forces; the desire to regulate all as-
pects of security, including the use of force beyond the letter of 
the law; imposing the principle of limited sovereignty upon its 
allies and neighbours; the militarisation of social and political 
life; and forcing an ideological image of the world upon other 
countries (now being presented as a confrontation between 
the ‘American world’ and the ‘Russian world’).
4. In the latest edition of its military doctrine, Russia implies 
that it has built up its potential of modern instruments for 
waging war; reached a state of combat readiness; and has an-
nounced its readiness to escalate tensions with the West. It has 
also promised to conduct information warfare in a more inte-
grated way. After the Russian aggression against Georgia and 
Ukraine, this announcement can be seen as preparing public 
opinion for further violations of the international order based 
on geopolitical motives – especially since the concept of infor-
mation warfare emerging from the doctrine has already been 
reflected in Russia’s political and military practices for years, 
in times of both war and peace.
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I. thE mIlItarISatIon of InformatIon
1. Information warfare in practice
On 29 December 2014, the government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gaze-
ta published a new edition of the Military Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation. This text also appeared on the webpage of the Securi-
ty Council of the Russian Federation, which prepares this kind of 
document1. Representatives of the Ministry of Defence’s leadership 
also offered their interpretations, explaining to the public the fun-
damental change in the international situation and the new meth-
ods the West is using to combat Russia, which have forced the Min-
istry to prepare an appropriate response. This is to consist of “new, 
non-traditional methods combining military and non-military 
measures in the four-dimensional combat area”. These were dis-
cussed during the Ministry of Defence’s council meeting of 30 Janu-
ary 2015, which was reported on all Russian television channels. As 
Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forc-
es of the Russian Federation, announced, the new measures will be 
included in the new defence plan for the period 2016-2020.
According to the Interfax agency2, the Ministry of Defence plans to 
expand its information campaign abroad. The doctrine is to be pre-
sented at the OSCE forum in Vienna, during the next review con-
ference in Geneva on the observance of the Biological Weapons and 
Toxin Convention (BTWC), and also at the review conference of the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in New York. Deputy Min-
ister Anatoly Antonov has also announced a series of meetings with 
representatives of the military attachés accredited in Moscow. This 
is supposedly linked to anti-Russian reviews of the new doctrine, 
in which Russia is presented as a ‘source of military threats’. The 
1 See http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/18/129.html. The term ‘military do-
c trine’ first appeared in the USSR in the 1920s. It can be succinctly defined 
as ‘the system of views prevailing in a country on the state’s military tasks 
and how to implement them.’
2 24 February 2015.
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Russian campaign has a clear aim: Moscow will tell the world what 
it wants the world to hear about its ‘defence’ doctrine.
The comments accompanying the Russian doctrine emphasised 
the importance of informational operations in contemporary 
conflicts, and the inclusion of information into the country’s de-
fensive arsenal. The tone of the commentary was set by the com-
muniqué from the meeting of the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation held on 20 December 2014, which approved the exist-
ing text of the doctrine. This work was supposedly undertaken 
“in view of the situation in and around Ukraine, as well as events 
in North Africa, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (...) by a decision of 
the RF Security Council of 5 July 2013 [sic], which recommended 
a consideration of the changing nature of threats to the RF”3. By 
emphasising the need for a reassessment of the global situation 
(the struggle of the world’s leading countries for their interests 
are characterised by indirect actions, exploiting the potential for 
protest among local populations, radical and extremist organisa-
tions, as well as private military companies), the Security Council 
reiterated the anti-NATO and anti-American mantra which has 
constantly been present in successive editions of the Doctrine: 
“NATO’s offensive potential is being developed directly on the 
borders of the Russian Federation. Measures are being actively 
taken to construct a global anti-missile defence system.”
General Gerasimov reiterated to the Security Council; “The At-
lantic Alliance is taking advantage of the events in Ukraine to 
move its own military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders. In 
Poland, in the Baltics, in the waters of the Black Sea and the Baltic 
Sea, NATO’s land, air and sea groupings are being reinforced”4. In 
the quotes given, the world is a simple place: America and NATO 
are encircling Russia, which must defend itself. The West is arm-
ing and demonstrating its power; so Russia must seek a response 
3 http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/838.html
4 http://vz.ru/politics/2014/12/29/722699.print.html
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to the American concept of the rapid global strike, and fight for 
the demilitarisation of space and the global information network, 
because it cannot permit the country and its surroundings to 
come under American “quasi-occupation”5.
A different interpretation was put forward in a report on 26 De-
cember 2014 from the RIA Novosti agency, which is part of the 
state’s propaganda company. By extracting a different quote from 
the doctrine (“A trend to move military challenges and threats to 
the information space and the domestic sphere of the Russian Fed-
eration is appearing”), it highlighted the domestic risks associated 
with information warfare which, according to the opinions per-
petuated in the media, is an instrument of Western interference 
in Russia’s internal affairs. This trend was demonstrated, for ex-
ample, in a statement by Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, the former Chief 
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
tion, and currently an advisor to the commander of the Interior 
Ministry of the Interior Troops. In it, he states: “the doctrine em-
phasises the need not only to defend the interests of the state, but 
also the state itself, with the emphasis on internal threats. This 
makes it possible to create a firewall against Western soft power, 
and also revises the relations between the various military ele-
ments in the organisation of the state”6.
The campaign described above is a manifestation of the ‘informa-
tion war’ Russia is conducting, which the military refer to as ‘infor-
mation warfare’. It is an enduring element of Russia’s information 
strategy. By actively participating in this campaign, representatives 
of the military establishment are perpetuating the official message. 
The authorities’ appeals are consistent with a long tradition in Rus-
sia. The words of the military men here have acquired the form of 
a particular kind of new-speak, although this does not change the 
5 Владимир Путин, ‘Россия не будет жить в полуоккупации’ (http://www.
rg.ru/2015/02/07/prezident-site.html).
6 http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/22618
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fundamental truth of the phenomenon. Their statements signify 
the militarisation of the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy, and 
the calling into question of the principles of international law and 
the security order of Europe. They are addressed to both domestic 
and foreign audiences. They remind the domestic hearer that Rus-
sia is an object of aggression from the West, and the Kremlin and 
the security agencies, which are pillars of the state, guarantee its 
stability – despite the enemy’s attempts to destabilise it. By mobi-
lising and sensitising the public to the threat from the West, the 
Kremlin legitimises its military policy on both the domestic and 
foreign arenas. The message to the foreign audience is more nu-
anced. The doctrine supplies the so-called opinion-formers, and 
in practice the moderators of the informational campaigns, with 
both positive and negative arguments. It also allows them to make 
threats and issue warnings not to disregard Russian interests. As 
an anonymous Russian soldier on the information frontline, writ-
ing under the pseudonym ‘Alex Wellington’, has written: “The new 
doctrine is addressed to the governments and military elites of the 
states in Russia’s sphere of influence; it offers them a guarantee of 
protection against the hostile influence of the so-called NATO part-
ners. It is also addressed to the enemies of Russia, because it clearly 
sets a red line that should not be crossed”.7
2. the ‘new’ comes back like a boomerang
In announcing the era of information warfare, most Russian com-
mentators have emphasised the new quality which information 
warfare brings to the state’s arsenal. This is an obvious exaggera-
tion, because all the previous editions of the doctrine have already 
discussed the matter. Its importance was already addressed in the 
military doctrine from the year 2000, in which the basic external 
threats included (point 5) “informational activities (information-
al-technical and informational-psychological) which are hostile 
and detrimental to the military security of the Russian Federation 
7 http://politrussia.com/vooruzhennye-sily/novyy-vzglyad-na-987/
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and its allies”. In this edition, the basic features of modern war 
included “active information rivalry, and the confusion of public 
opinion in the individual countries and in all global public opin-
ion” (point 3). According to that document, the international situ-
ation at that time was characterised by “intensifying information 
warfare and the use of information and other technologies (in-
cluding non-traditional technologies) for aggressive (expansion-
ist) purposes”. By including “humanitarian interventions” into 
this kind of technology, the doctrine implied the possibility of 
“achieving political goals by means of indirect actions”.
The military dimension of this question was highlighted in partic-
ular by the separate Information Security Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation, which was adopted in September 2000 and is still in 
force today. Information security is treated in this document as the 
basis of national security, and ‘information weapons’ are described 
as a tool to achieve political goals. The document introduced most 
of the concepts used today in Russian literature on the subject (“in-
formation warfare”, “information weapons”). The list of sources of 
external threats to Russia’s information security includes the ac-
tions of foreign structures “(...) aimed at the RF’s interests in the 
information sphere, the intensification of international rivalry to 
obtain technology and informational resources (...), and also the 
actions of foreign organisations, including foreign media, which 
are aimed at unfavourably presenting the image of Russia and the 
actions it takes.” Also in this edition of the doctrine, the govern-
ment warns of violations of the rights of Russian citizens and legal 
persons abroad, as well as the dissemination abroad of misinfor-
mation about Russian foreign policy. The main domestic threat, 
in turn, was described as “the illegal use of special measures to 
influence the individual, social, and group consciousness”. This 
comprehensive document, which discusses in detail the informa-
tional threat and suggests ways to improve the methods of com-
batting it in various spheres (the economy, domestic and foreign 
policy, science and technology, spiritual life, the areas of defence 
and law enforcement), is a kind of storehouse of the concepts and 
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expressions used in Russian official documents and the extensive 
literature on the subject of information security. However, in this 
context it should be noted that while journalists and civilian ex-
perts commonly use the slogan of ‘information war’, the military 
experts prefer the term ‘information warfare’.
The 2010 edition of the military doctrine lists “disruption of the 
functioning of organs of state power, important state and mili-
tary facilities and the information infrastructure of the Russian 
Federation” among the main domestic threats to military security 
(point 9). Information warfare is given both a wider and a nar-
rower definition: “actions of information warfare are being used 
to achieve political objectives without the use of force, and then to 
shape a favourable reaction from the international community to 
the use of military force” (point 13). In point 41, concerning sup-
plying the Armed Forces with weaponry and military equipment, 
the need is signalled to “improve (...) the common information 
space of the armed forces and other troops as part of the informa-
tion space of the Russian Federation (by the different actors in the 
information war conducting integrated activities), and to develop 
the forces and means of information warfare”.
As a result, in the December 2014 edition of the doctrine, it is difficult 
to find any new contexts for the issues under discussion. The cur-
rent version of the doctrine does not define any new, information-
based frontline of the fight – this was already laid out in the 2000 
version, like the other frontlines (political, diplomatic, economic, 
media, humanitarian, etc.). The new quality is the exposition of 
the role of information warfare, of the supposedly non-tradition-
al methods of conducting it, and the non-military organisational 
structures that implement it. Another new element is the clearer 
link with Western theories of non-lethal, non-conventional or hy-
brid war (a combination of conventional and unconventional meth-
ods of combat). In this way, it is emphasised that Russia’s actions are 
no different from how the West supposedly acts. This treatment, 
also used in the specialist literature, often leads foreign analysts 
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astray; they treat the Russian conceptual apparatus as a mir-
ror image of their own. Meanwhile, although they are adapting 
Western terms, the russians are following their own assump-
tions and logic, adapting them to their own needs, traditions 
and culture. While transferring Western theories to russian 
soil, they are mixing up the concepts of defence and attack, 
and adapting them for their own geostrategic retaliation8. As 
a result, the phenomenon described in Western theories as asym-
metric threats (social radicalisation or organised terrorism) has in 
the Russian theory become a method of asymmetric response to ac-
tions which are detrimental to Russia’s geopolitical interests.
3. the doctrinal concept of information warfare
At first glance, the latest edition of the doctrine does not contain any 
surprising innovations: it preserves the structure and reproduces 
most of the assumptions of the previous editions. The changes lie in 
the details, and generally appear in the passages devoted to threats 
to Russia, the characteristics of contemporary conflicts, and the as-
sessment of the current international situation. They are based on 
harsher versions of some of the language, and the removal or res-
toration of several subsections of the previous versions. A more in-
depth analysis of these details allows us to identify several general 
trends in Russia’s security policy which have become stronger in 
the period 2000-2014. These boil down to:
(1) blurring the boundaries between internal and external threats,
(2) stressing the importance of non-military means for putting 
pressure on potential adversaries, and
(3) giving armed struggles an ideological character.
By highlighting the informational threat and presenting it as 
a new type of danger, the doctrine’s authors have outlined the 
8 See Владимир Горбулин, ‘«Гибридная война» – как ключевой инстру-
мент российской геостратегии реванша’ (http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/
gibridnaya-voyna-kak-klyuchevoy-instrument-rossiyskoy-geostrategii-
revansha-_.html).
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contours of information warfare. It is treated primarily as an 
ideological struggle waged by indirect methods (both open and 
concealed), using a variety of military and non-military or-
ganisational structures (special forces, irregular armed forces, 
internal opposition in the enemy country). In the doctrine, in-
formation warfare has two dimensions: broader (as a separate 
type of combat) and narrower (as an element of support for 
military activities). Both share the assumption that informa-
tion warfare allows old politico-military tasks to be carried out 
in new ways.
The concept thus outlined is a synthesis of military and non-
military methods of struggle, traditional methods (sabotage, di-
versionary tactics, psychological campaigns), and those which 
employ new cyber-technologies. It is based on an ideology and an 
imperial vision of Russia and the world which justifies the strug-
gle. The main strategic goal of this struggle (the informational 
advantage) is defined in terms of geopolitical positions, in the 
confrontation with the United States and NATO. In practice, this 
concept leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflict, 
creating an excuse or justification for Russia’s participation in 
wars in which it is not officially a combatant.
4. Blurring the boundaries between internal  
and external threats
This trend has been expressed in the assertion of the idea that 
threats to Russia from NATO and the United States are growing, 
including the indirect informational and military influence of the 
US and the NATO states on the Russian sphere of influence. The 
current edition of the doctrine maintains the previous classifica-
tion of these threats as follows:
(1) the main external threats to military security (point 12),
(2) the main internal threats to military security (point 13), and
(3) the main military threats (paragraph 14).
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This approach has allowed the Russian military to expand its cata-
logue of potential challenges and goals. Whereas point 14 discusses 
direct threats, it has remained essentially unchanged (it is in line 
with the idea contained in the preamble ruling out the likelihood 
of war being unleashed against Russia on a large scale using con-
ventional means of destruction and nuclear weapons), but the 
wording on potential external threats to the Russian Federation’s 
military security (point 12) has definitely been made stronger; for 
example, the section which currently reads “the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) is developing its potential strength; 
taking on global functions, which it is carrying out in violation of 
international law; the infrastructure of NATO member states is ap-
proaching the borders of the Russian Federation, with the aim of 
expanding the bloc” said only that “NATO is striving to develop (…)” 
in the previous version of the doctrine. The hierarchy of threats is 
also significant in this context: the threat of terrorism is listed at 
number 10, after the dangers which NATO and the US pose to Rus-
sia. Compared with the 2010 text, the section on potential external 
threats has been expanded with four more subsections:
•	 the existence (uprising) of outbreaks of inter-ethnic and inter-
faith tensions, international activities by radical armed groups, 
foreign private military firms in areas adjacent to the state 
border of the russian federation and the borders of its al-
lies, as well as the existence of territorial conflicts, the rise of 
separatism and extremism in specific regions of the world;
•	 the use of information and communication technologies for 
political-military ends, to carry out actions contrary to in-
ternational law, directed against the sovereignty, political 
independence and territorial integrity of states, and posing 
a threat to international peace, security, global and regional 
stability;
•	 installing regimes whose policies threaten the interests 
of the russian federation, including as a result of the 
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overthrow of legitimate state authorities in countries 
bordering russia;
•	 subversive activities against the Russian Federation conduct-
ed by special services and organisations of states and their 
coalitions.
The only new element is a warning to countries bordering Russia 
on the inadmissibility of any policy threatening its interests. This 
section deserves attention for several reasons. First, the threat 
to the political regime has been raised to the rank of a military 
threat to the state. This kind of reflection is consistent with the 
traditional approach, in which political security9 is considered as 
the security of the institution of the state. Secondly, this section 
establishes the principle of the limited sovereignty of the allies 
and immediate neighbours of Russia: they are required to com-
ply strictly with the interests of Russia. Thirdly, Russia’s sphere 
of influence has thus been expanded: in previous editions it was 
defined as the area of the CIS, but in the present edition it now 
constitutes the area of the former Soviet Union and part of the for-
mer Eastern bloc countries. Fourthly and finally, this is the word-
ing used by Russian commentators referring to the situation in 
Ukraine, which has allegedly been forcibly colonised by the West.
Two other sections of the 2000 text have been changed; the first 
has had the phrase ‘foreign private military companies’ added, 
and the term ‘territorial claims’ has been replaced by the more 
imprecise term ‘territorial conflicts (противоречия),’ which 
opens up wider room for interpretation than the word ‘claims’ 
(this may also signal Russia’s desire to stimulate new ‘conflicts’, 
for example in the Baltic states). The second item, referring to 
9 The concept of ‘political security’ (sometimes ‘internal political security’) 
has been developed in Russian scientific discourse since the mid-90s. It is 
defined as the protection of a political system against destructive and desta-
bilising actions (for example, see Сергей Араев, ‘Некоторые аспекты поли-
тической безопасности Российской Федерации’, Власть, № 10, 2007).
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subversive activities by the special services of foreign states using 
informational-psychological means, was included in the Informa-
tion Security Doctrine, which in Part 2 refers to methods for en-
suring informational security in the area of defence.
The section on internal threats also appears to have new content. In 
addition to the sub-section highlighting the devastating impact of 
psychological campaigns on young people, the remaining elements 
essentially repeat the threat contained in the 2000 text. These are 
risks that are more political than military in nature. They present 
a development of the external threats to the Russian Federation’s in-
ternal political security, and also justify the assumption that chal-
lenges and threats are being posed to the information space and the 
domestic sphere of Russia. From official propaganda we also know 
that whereas in 2000 this primarily referred to so-called Chechen 
terrorists, this now refers to a ‘fifth column’ and ‘foreign agents’ 
financed from abroad, which is indeed emphasised elsewhere in 
the doctrine. This would confirm the hypothesis that the doctrine’s 
new wording has not so much fixed a change in the perception of 
risks, but rather a change to the ideological motivation.
The list of internal threats now runs as follows:
•	 activities focused on overthrowing the constitutional system 
of the Russian Federation by force, the destabilisation of the 
domestic political and social situation in the country, the dis-
ruption of the functioning of the organs of state power, impor-
tant state and military facilities and the informational infra-
structure;
•	 activities by terrorist organisations and individuals aimed at 
violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Rus-
sian Federation;
•	 activities aimed at informational activity targeted at the 
general population, primarily young people, which is 
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intended to undermine historical, spiritual and patriotic 
traditions in defence of the fatherland;
•	 the provocation of inter-ethnic and social tensions, extrem-
ism, the incitement of hatred or ethnic or religious hostilities.
It should be added that the internal and external threats as de-
fined in the doctrine serve to reinforce the image of the enemy 
which is omnipresent in Russian journalism and analytical texts. 
The enemy is identified in geopolitical terms (we/the Other). The 
enemy has a confrontational, mobilisation potential which is dif-
ficult to overestimate; this lends legitimacy to the Russian author-
ities, masking their failures and strengthening the ideological na-
ture of the information war.
5. the growing importance of non-military methods  
of combat
The trend of the rising importance of non-military methods of 
struggle has its roots in the perception of threats. This has been 
emphasised by the removal of the chapter entitled ‘The sovereign-
ty of the Armed Forces in Russian military policy’ (which disap-
peared in 2010), suggesting that all military formations have now 
been subordinated to the Armed Forces. This can be interpreted 
as a desire to legitimise the role of the civilian special services as 
key actors in the doctrine of the so-called non-military methods 
of struggle. This trend has also been highlighted by an analysis of 
the changes in the section entitled ‘Characteristic features of con-
temporary armed conflicts.’ Although the increasing role of infor-
mation warfare and the ability to achieve political ends by means 
of indirect actions has been consistently emphasised since 2000, 
in the 2014 text the description of contemporary conflicts has tak-
en on the clear outline of so-called asymmetric, hybrid war.
This has been contributed to by the assembly in one place of the 
following forms of wording:
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•	 the complex use of the armed forces, as well as political, eco-
nomic, informational and other non-military measures, im-
plemented with the broad use of the potential of public pro-
tests and special operations forces;
•	 striking at the enemy throughout its entire territory, in the 
global information space, air and extra-terrestrial space, land 
and sea;
•	 the participation in armed clashes of irregular armed units 
and private military companies;
•	 the use of indirect and asymmetric methods of action;
•	 the use of political forces and social movements financed and 
managed from outside.
This trend also includes the new concept of ‘the system of non-nu-
clear containment’, defined in general terms as “a range of foreign 
policy measures, military and military-technical measures aimed 
to prevent aggression against the Russian Federation without the 
use of nuclear weapons”. It should be added in passing that this 
move does not in any way diminish the role of the nuclear con-
tainment system, as was highlighted in points 16, 27 and 32 of the 
doctrine. Moreover, Gen. Gerasimov has stressed that it still has 
priority10. The concept of ‘non-nuclear containment’ highlights 
the role of the non-military component in contemporary con-
flicts, and also covertly links the special services to the military 
organisation of the state11. Beside the Armed Forces which form its 
10 http://arsenal-otechestva.ru/gerasimov-o-sostoyanii-vooruzhennyx-sil-
rf.html
11 The doctrines and laws (for example in the Russian national security concept 
to the year 2020) include the more broadly defined national security system, 
which includes “the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces, other troops, milita-
rised formations and bodies, which under federal legislation includes mili-
tary service and/or law enforcement, as well as the federal government au-
thorities involved in guaranteeing the national security of the state”.
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basis, together with the so-called other troops traditionally listed 
in previous editions, there are two new forces: militarised forma-
tions and bodies, and special formations created for the duration 
of a given war. In the first occurrence in the text (in point 8 ex-
plaining the basic concepts), these new forces are given the ab-
breviated term ‘organs’. In the rest of the text, the phrase “the 
Armed Forces, other troops and organs” is used consistently. This 
approach confirms the modus operandi applied in practice, with 
a key role for the special services using the indirect methods and 
means outlined in the doctrine (diversionary tactics, sabotage, 
the organisation of irregular armed formations). In the Russian 
language, the word ‘organs’ as commonly used describes the au-
thorities of law and order, which include the prosecutor’s office, 
the police and the secret services.
The strictly military objectives and tasks related to information 
warfare are rather poorly defined. These are associated with the 
clearly emphasised need to take integrated action in the informa-
tion space (the task of qualitatively improving the unified infor-
mation space of the Armed Forces, other troops and organs, as 
part of the unified information space of the Russian Federation), 
the need to continue to improve the forces and means of informa-
tion warfare; to improve and insulate the security systems of the 
Armed Forces, other troops and organs; and to create the condi-
tions to reduce the risk of the use of information and communica-
tion technologies for political-military ends which do not accord 
with the law.
6. Presenting the ideological nature of the battle
In the previous editions of the doctrine, the ideological image of 
the world and international relations was reflected in the wording 
regarding global competition for a multipolar model of the world, 
a wording which defined Russia’s sphere of influence; as well as in 
reports of discrimination against Russian citizens abroad, which 
contained a declaration that they would be defended. In 2000, 
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after the NATO operation in Kosovo, any criticism of the Alli-
ance for ignoring the existing mechanisms of international secu-
rity (the UN, the OSCE) was subdued and veiled. Also in the 2010 
edition, “global development has been characterised by a weak-
ening of ideological confrontation, a reduction in the economic, 
political and military influence of some states and alliances, and 
an increase in the influence of other countries aspiring to world 
domination, multi-polarity and the globalisation of various kinds 
of processes”. In the 2014 version, in contrast, the ideological con-
frontation has taken on a clear shape, taking the form of compet-
ing value systems and models of development: “The current stage 
of global development is characterised by an intensity of com-
petition, tension in various areas of inter-state and inter-
regional cooperation, competition between systems of values 
and models of development, and instability of the processes of 
economic and political development at global and regional levels, 
which affects the overall complexity of international relations. 
A gradual diversification of influences on the new centres of eco-
nomic growth and political attraction is taking place”.
This confrontation / ideological rivalry is highlighted by different 
details scattered throughout the text of the doctrine; for example, 
the US is accused of destabilising the situation in the countries 
bordering Russia; of deploying its forces on the territory of coun-
tries bordering Russia; creating strategic missile defence systems; 
implementing the concept of the global strike; planning to place 
weapons in space, etc. This is also highlighted in the doctrine’s 
image of the current geopolitical situation: the United States is 
not the only centre of attraction, Russia has become a centre of 
attraction for weaker partners, and is also a leader in the field of 
observing and reinforcing international law. The United States is 
the ideological opponent of all countries opposed to its hegemony 
in the world, whereas Russia offers a model of development  and 
values different than those of America. The US is also, as may 
be presumed, an ideological opponent to... Europe, which is still 
being encouraged to “create mutually beneficial bilateral and 
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multilateral mechanisms to counter potential missile attacks, 
including if necessary the creation of common anti-missile sys-
tems with equal participation from Russia”. This is an echo of the 
Russian Federation’s strategic objective, which is to break up the 
American-European alliance. Meanwhile, Russia’s place in the 
world is further emphasised by a declaration that it is maintain-
ing an equal dialogue about European security with the European 
Union and NATO, as well as a declaration (...) of dialogue with 
countries concerned about new kinds of risks associated with the 
use of information and communication technologies for political-
military purposes.
The information space has also been ideologised. Enemy action in 
this area is aimed not only at “undermining the Russian histori-
cal, spiritual and patriotic tradition”, but also “against the sover-
eignty, political independence and territorial integrity of states, 
and also constitutes a threat to international peace, security, glob-
al and regional stability”.
 The question of revising the established order in the field of glob-
al security had already appeared in earlier texts and doctrines. 
However, until now it had never taken on such a confrontational 
tone. Russia portrays the United States as being almost its only 
problem, and has declared its willingness to escalate tensions, 
by extending its common field of security and defence to South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia12 (which hitherto had included Russia and 
Belarus) and giving a military dimension not only to its Arctic 
12 President Vladimir Putin also announced the creation of a common secu-
rity and defence space after the signing in March 2015 of a treaty of alli-
ance with South Ossetia. (For example see http//rg.ru/2015/03/18/souz-site.
html). A similar agreement was signed with Abkhazia in November 2014. 
The agreements signed by Moscow with the para-states – which are de 
jure part of the territory of Georgia but declared independence after the 
Russian-Georgian war in 2008 (which provided for the abolition of their 
borders with Russia, and for the establishment of common foreign and se-
curity policies with Russia) – were de facto a disguised way of incorporating 
them into the Russian Federation.
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policy, but also to policies supporting regimes hostile to Russia in 
countries bordering the Russian Federation. This emphasis on the 
destructive role of the United States raises the prospect that Rus-
sia is fighting not so much for a multipolar world, but rather for 
the restoration of a bipolar world, guaranteeing it a comfortable 
security environment.
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II. an attEmPt at IntErPrEtatIon
1. an asymmetrical response to the West’s hybrid war?
In the doctrine, we do not find any ideas regarding the ‘cyber-
netisation’ of armed conflicts, or any mention of electronic tools 
for ‘cyberwar’, i.e. the destruction of the enemy’s information re-
sources, which – as we might think – would be the responsibility 
of the Armed Forces, and should be reflected in the document we 
are analysing. We will not find in it any precise definitions of ‘in-
formation space’, ‘information warfare’, ‘asymmetric operations’, 
‘non-military means of warfare’, ‘non-nuclear containment’ or 
the other terms referenced. At the same time, they appear to us as 
part of the general circulation of ideas in Russia, which are pre-
sented as a Russian response to the so-called Western hybrid war 
(against Ukraine, Russia and other countries), aiming to block the 
post-Soviet states’ integration strategy with the EU and NATO.
Statements made by official representatives of the Ministry of De-
fence and military experts are helpful in explaining the content 
of these concepts. They show a high level of consistency with the 
doctrine’s conceptual apparatus, as well as with the terminology 
used in Western military thought. The theoretical quarterly In-
formatsyonnye Voyny (Информационные войны) is a mine of in-
formation on the subject; it has been published since 2008 by the 
Russian Academy of Sciences in cooperation with the Academy of 
Military Sciences as part of the Academy for Informational Self-
Defence project13. Their analysis leads to the conclusion that on 
the one hand, they enable the methods of ‘disguise’ (маскировка) 
perfected over decades by first the Soviet and then the Russian 
special services; and on the other, they sanction those methods by 
borrowing the fruits of Western ideas and putting them to their 
own purposes, which thus enables Russia to use modern methods 
and means of warfare.
13 See http://www.iwars.su/
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The growing importance of non-military means of warfare, indi-
rect and asymmetric activities was emphasised inter alia by Valery 
Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of 
the Russian Federation, at a conference at the Academy of Mili-
tary Sciences in January 2013: “the emphasis in the methods 
of combat being used is shifting towards political, economic, 
informational, humanitarian and other non-military meas-
ures, and implemented by exploiting the potential of protest 
among the local population. All this is supported by indirect 
methods, including the execution of information warfare opera-
tions and the operations of special forces.” Elsewhere, the gen-
eral specified: “the importance of asymmetric and indirect 
actions is rising. they may be based on political isolation, 
economic sanctions, the blockade of lines of communication 
via sea, air and land, violent intimidation, as well as the in-
troduction of international peacekeeping forces under the 
pretext of defending human rights and humanitarian opera-
tions. In the system of indirect actions, special and informational 
campaigns and operations will have a specific place”14.
Gerasimov emphasised therein the role of the non-military com-
ponent of warfare at every stage of the conflict – from the assess-
ment of the situation, through the implementation of special op-
erations with its involvement, up to the maintenance of order and 
the establishment of a loyal government. These indirect asym-
metric measures also include the inspiration and mobilisation of 
the enemy’s internal opposition, classified operations by special 
forces, and the accompanying informational activity. His state-
ment also shows that these asymmetric and indirect non-military 
measures as defined are new elements in the doctrine, referred to 
as ‘non-nuclear containment’. This hypothesis was confirmed by 
Gen. Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Military Academy of Geopo-
litical Problems, who understands the concept of non-nuclear 
14 See http://arsenal-otechestva.ru/gerasimov-o-sostoyanii-vooruzhennyx-
sil-rf.html; http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632
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containment to include bringing about political and econom-
ic losses with the support of conventional strike forces15, that 
is, the combination of three factors: political, economic and 
military.
These doctrinal concepts can also be found in the work of Igor 
Panarin, a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Foreign 
Ministry, a former analyst for the KGB and FAPSI, and a leading 
representative of Russian informational geopolitics. In his arti-
cle ‘The doctrine of Russia’s information warfare’16, he defines 
information warfare as “a kind of warfare between parties 
in which special (political, economic, diplomatic, military, 
and other) methods and measures are used to influence the 
informational environment of the enemy, and to defend one’s 
own environment in order to achieve one’s defined goals”. 
Like the authors of the 2000 edition of the doctrine, Panarin 
distinguishes two types of information warfare: informational-
technical (where the targets are communication channels, tel-
ecommunications systems, radio-electronic transmissions) and 
informational-psychological (the impact on the minds of the op-
ponents’ political elite and the general public; opinion-forming 
and decision-making centres).
The model of information warfare outlined by Panarin includes 
three components:
(1) strategic political analysis,
(2) informational operations and
(3) informational counteraction (counteroffensive).
15 http://www.pravda.ru/politics/military/defence/08-01-2015/1241179-dokt-
rina-0/
16 Игорь Панарин, ‘Система информационного противодействия’ (http://
vpk-news.ru/articles/3677); see also http://www.km.ru/spetsproekty/2012 
/07/17/otnosheniya-rossii-i-stran-zapadnoi-evropy/o-doktrine-informa-
tsionnogo-proti
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In his model of the system (which he identifies with the system of 
informational containment) Panarin includes the Armed Forces 
and special services, which – as he states – should develop the ca-
pacity to defend the country against informational aggression by 
the enemy in peacetime. To do this, a special rapid reaction force 
supported by the space-based Glonass information monitoring 
system must be created. This model for defending the country’s 
informational sovereignty, according to Panarin, requires Russia 
to strengthen its informational presence in all the strategically 
important regions of the world. This will enable an operational 
response to any crisis, and will at the same time encourage the 
establishment of a strategic balance of power in regions of vital 
interests to Russia.
By bringing together the strategies of indirect action, soft power 
and the technology of ‘managed chaos’ (‘controlled destabilisa-
tion’), Vladimir Kariakin, a military expert for the Russian In-
stitute for Strategic Studies17, estimates that these are currently 
the most effective methods of international geopolitical struggle. 
Indirect action and soft power can lead to the aggressor-state 
inflicting ideological sabotage and subversion on the victim-
state. These techniques lay the groundwork for an environment 
favourable to the aggressor, which offers the potential for protest, 
that is, a factor for destruction and change in the political regime 
hostile to the aggressor.
Kariakin also makes recommendations on how to develop strate-
gies for informational counteraction. The dissemination of reli-
able (read: desirable for Russia) information requires the transla-
tion of the other’s language of images and symbols into one’s own 
language of interpretation, which accords with tradition – within 
one’s own system of ideological and cultural terms and concepts. 
17 Владимир Карякин, ‘Стратегии непрямых действий, «мягкой силы» 
и технологий «управляемого хаоса» как инструменты переформати-
рования политических пространств’, Информационные войны, № 3 (31), 
2014 (for the electronic version, see http//www.iwars.su).
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Kariakin stresses the importance of knowing how to impose one’s 
own rules of the game, and how to defend one’s own arguments in 
the context of the global information space.
In the understanding of Gerasimov, Ivashov, Panarin and Ka-
riakin, information warfare includes, on the one hand, the pro-
tection of one’s own information space; and on the other, acting 
in the information sphere of one’s potential adversary. Informa-
tion space here has both a virtual (a space including symbols 
and ideological values, considered as a field of psychological in-
fluence) and a material nature (informational infrastructure, 
physical resources, databases, computer networks and telecom-
munications). By giving information warfare a confrontational 
dimension, these authors are also emphasising that it requires 
the involvement of both military and non-military tools. It is 
to be carried out by a number of entities (special forces, intelli-
gence and counterintelligence offensives, irregular formations, 
the potential for protest, traditional and electronic media), and 
draws upon a broad spectrum of activities (political, economic, 
social, military, intelligence, counter-intelligence, diplomatic, 
propaganda et al.). The Russian state has been cramming every 
means it has in its arsenal into this concept: from investments 
to economic boycotts; from pipeline diplomacy to energy black-
mail; from diplomatic pressure to corrupting the political elites 
of other countries; from soft power to provocations and threats 
of a military nature, state terrorism, and so on. When non-mil-
itary preventative measures fail, the strategy provides for the 
use of conventional military means: the argument of force. This 
battle is taking place on many fronts: domestically (emphasising 
the stability of the Russian regime, projecting the role of a ruling 
elite which has a vision for the development of Russia, as well as 
mobilising their own public by means of tried and tested mecha-
nisms for imposing images of the internal and external enemy, 
etc.) and externally (with the aim of management by fear, or by 
neutralising the damage to Russia’s image caused by its real mil-
itary aggression).
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The military doctrine and the Russian theorists have sketched 
out a theory that can be applied in both peace and war. They un-
derline that effective combat must be carried out on the basis of 
a plan, a system, consistently and over the long term. The stra-
tegic goal of this combat is to achieve informational superiority. 
The catalogue of tactical objectives is extensive: bullying and dis-
criminating against the opponent, causing him physical and eco-
nomic losses, destabilising the domestic situation in the country 
which is the target of information warfare, demonstrating one’s 
own military, political and economic superiority, military black-
mail, retaliation (revenge) on the enemy which rejected Russian 
offers, et al.
2. the endless public debate
The RIA Novosti news agency, the RT television station, and the 
other Russian media in their wake, have for some time been re-
porting on the new information security doctrine for Russia. As 
they explain it, the 2000 edition did not take into account today’s 
realities, associated with the explosive development of IT, as well 
as the risks to which Russian society is now exposed: informa-
tion warfare, cyber-espionage, cyber-crime. The doctrine’s new 
edition is intended to clarify a number of terms such as ‘infor-
mation sphere’, ‘information policy’ and ‘national sovereignty in 
the global information space’. It concludes that there is only one 
effective way to ensure information security: a joint effort by all 
Internet users, journalists, local authorities, civil society organi-
sations, etc. This is another manifestation of the consistent devel-
opment of the ‘besieged fortress’ syndrome and a communal sense 
of responsibility for the state. Similar announcements have been 
made in the past. In 2012, for example, the website of the upper 
house of the Russian parliament posted a plan for a ‘Concept of 
cyber-security strategy’18, and also called for a broad public dis-
cussion on threats to information security. The project did not 
18 http://council.gov.ru/press-centre/discussion/38324
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make it to the implementation phase, however, because the Fed-
eral Security Service opposed it. During hearings in the Federa-
tion Council on the subject, representatives of the FSB questioned 
the very term ‘cyber-security’ as used in the West, claiming that 
it narrowed down the definition of the wider phenomenon, and 
merely referred to the protection of equipment and communica-
tion channels.
The public debate in Russia about informational threats, which 
was initiated by the Security Council of the Russian Federation 
in the late 1990s, has continued to this day. Since the beginning 
this debate has been distinguished by the role of the so-called 
institutions of force, which have been presented as the main 
executors of the strategy for adaptation to the requirements of 
cyber-security. This also includes the so-called Chekist ideology, 
which treats the security sector as a pillar of power derived from 
the special forces of Vladimir Putin’s team. Over time, the de-
bate has coincided with the appearance in the ex-Soviet space of 
the so-called ‘colour revolutions’19, which led to a renaissance of 
traditional topics related to the psychological struggle between 
East and West. In Russian literature, the colour revolutions are 
regarded as “the most socially dangerous form of clashes be-
tween intelligence services”20.
Despite the stated objectives (the conceptualisation of a new field 
of security, informational security; clarification of the basic con-
cepts; preparation of the necessary legislation and new organisa-
tional solutions), the participants in the debate have focused on 
a diagnosis of the impact of IT on the overall political, economic 
and social development in Russia, making the public aware of the 
problems of informational threats, and analysing the Western 
19 The term describes the social movements in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), 
in Kyrgyzstan (2005), as a result of which socio-political changes took place.
20 See for example А.В. Манойло, Государственная информационная поли-
тика в особых условиях, Moscow, 2003, p. 293.
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theoretical, legal and organisational ideas in the field of cyber-
security. Some of these ideas have been transposed onto Russian 
territory. Since 2003, just as in the West, the ‘cyber’ aspect of se-
curity has appeared in the context of the ‘critical infrastructure 
of the state’, a term borrowed from the area of  crisis management. 
This includes top-secret ‘critically important objects’ (КВО) and 
‘key information infrastructure systems’ (КСИИ, such as the in-
formation and communication systems of the organs of the state 
authorities, the special services, law enforcement and the Armed 
Forces, systems for warning about and combating the effects of 
emergencies, navigation systems, credit and financial systems, 
satellite communications systems, systems for managing the pro-
duction and transport of oil and gas, transportation systems, wa-
ter supplies, electricity, et al.).
Hence the conclusion that the Russians have adapted Western 
theories, technologies and solutions, adjusting them to their 
own concepts and their own “ideological and cultural system 
of concepts and terms” (to quote Kariakin). However, ‘cyber-se-
curity’ has apparently has not yet been included in this system. 
Nor is it to be found in the conceptual system of the military doc-
trine. Nevertheless, the latter does include active intelligence 
methods, such as have been developed in the Soviet Union since 
the 1920s; these have now been enriched with IT technologies 
(cyber-espionage, trolling), which are presented as an asymmet-
ric, indirect component of information warfare. The doctrine 
also refers to ‘non-lethal soft power’, implemented by ‘civil so-
ciety’ organisations run along military lines. Contrary to expec-
tations, the doctrine does not even include any suggestions on 
the delimitation of the competences and responsibilities of the 
Armed Forces and civilian special services in the various fields 
of information warfare. This is – as the position of the FSB stated 
above confirms – exactly the intended outcome: strict defini-
tions would pose constraints, both on the state apparatus which 
obtains and secures information, as on the state system of infor-
mation warfare.
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3. cultural conditions for information warfare
Western theories of international relations attempt to explain 
this Russian doublethink (taking over someone else’s ideas while 
at the same time rejecting them; appealing to international law, 
such as the right of peoples to self-determination, while at the 
same illegally crossing Ukraine’s borders, etc.) in terms of a cul-
tural paradigm, within the concept of strategic culture. Generally 
speaking, this defines the relationship between political culture 
and the strategy of using force for political purposes. This concept 
appeared at the end of the Cold War, mainly as a result of research 
into the USSR’s policy on the international stage, which in terms 
of political realism was inexplicable.
The specific characteristics of Soviet/Russian strategic culture 
(as it was defined) were defined by the pioneers in this line of 
research, Jack Snyder and Colin S. Gray. They brought it down to 
a few items, such as: the constant desire to ensure national se-
curity without regard to the safety of other nations; the assump-
tion that war and peace are different phases of the same process 
of the struggle for power; mythologising one’s own army and 
special services; an unwillingness to make concessions even in 
response to the concessions of other countries. Similar conclu-
sions were drawn by Thomas Graham, who moreover noted the 
authoritarian regime’s age-old fear of revolt; the alienation and 
passivity of its citizens, whom the regime keeps in a state of con-
stant mobilisation; and the experience of imperial Russia (the 
memory of the times of territorial conquest, and the empire’s 
collapses in 1917 and 1991)21. These are expansionist experiences: 
21 J. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Op-
erations, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1977; C. Gray, ‘National Styles 
in Strategy. The American Example’, International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 
(Autumn, 1981). See also Rafał Wiśniewski, ‘Kultura strategiczna, czyli 
o kulturowych uwarunkowaniach polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa’ 
[Strategic culture, or Cultural determinants of foreign and security policy]. 
Strategic Overview, 2012, No. 1, pp. 163-175.
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the building of a security buffer is always transformed into their 
absorption into Russia.
Most theorists emphasise the continuity of Russian strategic cul-
ture throughout history, regardless of the shape of the state (be it 
the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or the Russian Federation). 
The cultural factor helps explain the constancy of the Russian 
military doctrine’s political assumptions (based on the ‘besieged 
fortress’ syndrome, the preference given to the importance of do-
mestic political security above other sectors of state security such 
as external, social or economic security; the constant striving to 
bring the population to a state of readiness for mobilisation, et al.). 
The specific strategic culture can be explained by the perception 
of risks as outlined above: the spectres of delegitimisation of pow-
er (a crucial element in the collapse of the USSR in 1991) and social 
radicalisation seem more dangerous to the Russian Federation’s 
authorities than the fear of economic collapse or terrorism, which 
recede into the background. It also explains the glaring anachro-
nism in the doctrine’s wording: Russia, like the Soviet Union be-
fore it, is a global nuclear power, fighting for peace and the denu-
clearisation of the world, the demilitarisation of outer space and 
information space, and for its own system of values  and its own 
model of development.
Moreover, in the light of Moscow’s real political practices, the ge-
opolitical method of the Russian theory of information warfare 
allows us to expand the list of the characteristics of Russian stra-
tegic culture:
(1) a tendency to guarantee the interests of the state through pre-
emptive intervention (for example the invasion of Ukraine, or 
conferring a military dimension to Russia’s Arctic policy);
(2) the syndrome of legalisation (the desire to superficially regulate 
all aspects of security, and also the use of force above the law);
(3) imposing the principle of limited sovereignty on neighbouring 
countries and allies (which has been confirmed not only by the 
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invasion of Ukraine, but also by Russia’s inclusion of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia into the common security field, despite the 
fact that none of Russia’s allies have recognised these para-
states);
(4) cultivating the principles of social life based on military pat-
terns (the military-patriotic education of the young; the top-
down militarisation and securitisation of the so-called civil 
society institutions; projects such as the Academy of Infor-
mational Self-Defence or the Russian Intelligence School; and 
above all,
(5) imposing a persistent ideological image of the world, in terms 
of confrontation between the ‘American world’ and the ‘Rus-
sian world’, between liberal and conservative values.
This specifically Russian cultural factor is helpful in explaining 
the motivations and arguments used in its information warfare. 
It also helps to identify many sustainable features of this struggle: 
the diversity of the tools it uses (from manipulation, intimidation 
by historical warfare and so on, up to state terrorism and armed 
attacks); a global, flexible approach; operations conducted simul-
taneously on many levels (diplomatic and military, economic and 
media). And because both the doctrine and the official propagan-
da have announced its intensification, the role of cultural analysis 
will increase. This should be taken further into account in consid-
erations of security and defence policy, as well as when forecast-
ing the fate of Russian geopolitical projects associated with this 
policy, including its leading project – the Eurasian union (Eau). 
this project is dictated by imperial egotism and a disregard 
of the interests of sovereign states. In its pursuit to extend the 
EaU to include Ukraine, the Russians did succeed in exploiting the 
cultural inconsistencies in this country, but at the same time, pro-
cesses were initiated which led to the strengthening of Ukrainian 
national culture and the creation of new symbols (the Euromaid-
an, the ‘Heavenly Hundred’). At the moment, this is undermin-
ing the efforts of the Russian propaganda front, because neither 
Ukrainian nor global public opinion believes in the sincerity of 
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the intentions of an aggressor which presents itself as a ‘guaran-
tor of security’. In the case of Ukraine, the ‘informational’ bombs 
and mines have turned out to be duds.
The Russian military doctrine, however, gives us to understand 
that it has built up its potential of modern instruments for wag-
ing war, reached a state of readiness to mobilise, and is promising 
to escalate tensions. It has announced the further development of 
the forces and means to conduct information warfare, and that it 
can carry it out in a more integrated way. After the Russian ag-
gression against Georgia and Ukraine, this announcement can be 
seen as preparing public opinion for subsequent violations of in-
ternational order for geopolitical reasons – especially as the mili-
tarised theory of information warfare mentioned above has for 
years been reflected in political and military practice in Russia, in 
times of both war and peace.
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III. concluSIonS
The information warfare emerging from the Russian Federation’s 
military doctrine is the same phenomenon that journalists and 
civilian analysts have been describing as ‘information war’. Its 
objectives, means and methods do not fit into the conventional 
notion of war.
Defining these in terms familiar from Western theories is point-
less. the Western terms borrowed into russian theory and 
practice have been adapted to traditional activities. The doc-
trine’s civilian and military authors think in terms of sabotage, 
subversion, disguising their targets and leading their opponents 
into error; and not in the terms of categories of asymmetric threats 
or unconventional, non-lethal warfare borrowed from Western 
military thought.
As a result, the russian concept of information warfare is in 
fact a synthesis of traditional, old and modern methods (re-
sulting from the current state of universal access to It tech-
nology), military and non-military structures and means of 
influence. By introducing non-military elements into the mili-
tary organisation of the state, the doctrine confirms the modus 
operandi used hitherto. By giving a military dimension to ideo-
logical confrontation, the doctrine highlights the geopolitical mo-
tivations of Russian policy. Hence the conclusion that monitoring 
ideological and cultural trends will allow us to grasp the current 
objectives and motivations of this policy, of which information 
warfare is now a permanent part.
The continual referral to Western models for carrying out infor-
mation warfare, and the emphasis on the need to improve the 
forces and means of this warfare, is a diversionary tactic designed 
to distract attention.
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Information warfare in russia is a systemic phenomenon; no 
other country deals with this issue on such a scale; no-one invests 
so much organisational and financial effort in it. Information 
warfare, as it has been conducted for decades, reveals enduring, 
long-term qualities based on Russian strategic culture.
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